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Abstract 
An important economic paradox that frequently arises in the economic literature is that 
countries with abundant natural resources are poor in terms of real gross domestic product per 
capita. This paradox, known as the ‘resource curse’, is contrary to the conventional intuition 
that natural resources help to improve economic growth and prosperity. Using panel data for 
95 countries, this study revisits the resource curse paradox in terms of oil resources abundance 
for the period 1980–2017. In addition, the study examines the role of trade openness in 
influencing the relationship between oil abundance and economic growth. The study finds that 
trade openness is a possible avenue to reduce the resource curse. Trade openness allows 
countries to obtain competitive prices for their resources in the international market and access 
advanced technologies to extract resources more efficiently. Therefore, natural resource–rich 
economies can reduce the resource curse by opening themselves to international trade. 
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1. Introduction 
The conventional intuition is that natural resources help to increase a country’s economic 
growth. Contrary to this, the literature reports that countries rich in natural resources tend to 
have lower real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita than resource-poor countries—a 
paradox known as the ‘resource curse’ [see, e.g., Auty (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), 
Gylfason (2000) and Van der Ploeg (2011)].1 For example, oil-rich countries such as Venezuela, 
Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo are poor in terms of real GDP per capita, while resource-
poor countries such as Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong have very high real GDP per 
capita. 2  The literature identifies several factors that explain this paradox such as poor 
institutional quality, political rent-seeking, commodity price volatility and lack of 
diversification. However, several other factors remain unexplored. This study examines a 
country’s trade openness as a channel that may influence the resource curse.3 The idea that 
trade openness increases economic growth is well known; however the role of trade openness 
in reducing the resource curse is yet to be explored. 
Trade openness increases real GDP per capita in a resource-rich country in different 
ways. Our hypothesis is that increased trade helps to lessen the resource curse problem by 
reallocating resources more efficiently. It provides countries access to the international market 
and higher prices for their products. This access to international prices increases the country’s 
income and real GDP per capita. Trade openness also makes available opportunities to use 
advanced technologies for more efficient extraction of natural resources. With the use of new 
technologies, natural resource–rich countries can produce intermediate and final goods from 
primary goods and earn more profits. Trade openness helps to modernise the full economy by 
                                                          
1 The term ‘resource curse’ was first coined by Auty (1993) to explain the negative relationship between resource 
dependency and economic growth. 
2 Note that this is not true for all countries. For example, oil-rich countries such as Norway, Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar have high GDP per capita. 
3 Trade openness is the sum of export and import of the goods and services measured as a percentage of GDP. 
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improving other related sectors such as roads and transport systems (Pedersen 2000), financial 
sectors (Braun & Raddatz 2008) and bureaucratic systems (Dutt 2009). Overall, trade openness 
plays a crucial role in converting natural resources into a blessing rather a curse. Figure 1 shows 
the relationship between real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) for the period 1980–
2017.4 
Figure 1: Relation between real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2019). 
Despite the positive impact of trade openness on economic growth and development, it 
was not considered comprehensively when studying the resource curse, aside from a brief 
discussion in a few studies.5 Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2011) investigate the role of trade and 
institutions in reducing the resource curse and find that the resource curse becomes weaker in 
countries with a high degree of trade openness. In their seminal study, Sachs and Warner (1995) 
also find that trade openness improves economic growth by reducing the resource curse. 
However, these studies are based on cross-section growth models where the average growth 
                                                          
4 In Figure 1, we use the average data of real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) for countries with high oil 
reserves. 
5 Throughout this study, we use change in real GDP per capita and economic growth interchangeably. 
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over recent decades is regressed on a measure of resource abundance and a selection of control 
variables. 
In this study, we use a panel data framework to investigate the impact of trade openness 
on the resource curse.6 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the 
relationship between the resource curse and trade openness in a panel data framework (rather 
than cross-sectional long-term perspective).7 
This study uses an unbalanced dynamic panel data model that covers 95 countries for 
the period 1980–2017. Countries and periods are based on data availability from the World 
Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). We use the data for the full sample period 
(1980–2017) and then split the sample period into two subsample periods: 1980–1994 [before 
the World Trade Organization (WTO)] and 1995–2017 (after the WTO). We assume that the 
commencement of the WTO in 1995 contributed to significant increases in international trade 
and that increased trade helps to lessen the resource curse by more efficiently reallocating 
resources. Moreover, many countries reduced their trade tariffs under the WTO agreements 
which has helped to boost international trade during the last two decades.8 For example, China 
abolished non-tariff barriers and reduced tariffs in the manufacturing sector after it joined the 
WTO in 2001. This significantly increased the demand for metals such as copper, aluminium, 
and steel (Coates & Luu 2012). This increased demand probably had an exogenous impact on 
the growth of other countries. For example, Andersen et al. (2014) empirically found that 
                                                          
6 Panel data usually gives researchers a large number of data points, increasing the degrees of freedom and 
reducing the collinearity among explanatory variables, thus improving the efficiency of econometric estimates 
(Hsiao 2014). Moreover, the combined panel data matrix set consists of a time series for each cross-sectional 
member in the data set and offer a variety of estimation methods (Asteriou & Hall 2015). 
7 Few studies use panel data models to discuss the resource curse hypothesis. By using a panel data model 
consisting of 56 countries from 1972–2000, Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011) found that point resource 
dependence harms economic growth in developing countries. Similarly, Goderis (2008) found the existence of 
resource curse by using panel data for 130 countries for the period 1963–2003. 
8 The WTO is an intergovernmental organisation that deals with the regulation of trade in goods, services and 
intellectual property between participating countries by providing a framework for negotiating trade agreements 
and a dispute resolution process. Subramanian and Wei (2007) argue that the WTO contributed to 120 per cent 
more trade in 2000, valued about US$8 trillion. 
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China’s accession to the WTO contributed to improving the growth rate in sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
This study focuses on oil as a natural resource because it is a highly tradeable 
commodity. As oil price is directly linked to the production process, it may have a significant 
impact on inflation, employment and output (Guo & Kliesen 2005). Moreover, point-source 
resources such as oil are more prone to rent-seeking that leads to resource curse (Isham et al. 
2005; Boschini, Pettersson & Roine 2007).9 In this study, we use oil rent (% of GDP) as a 
measure of natural resource abundance. 10  Although our study finds the existence of the 
resource curse, trade openness significantly decreases the resource curse problem, especially 
after the introduction of the WTO. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, no previous studies have examined trade openness as a transmission channel for 
reducing the resource curse by using dynamic panel data models. Second, using panel data 
allows us to evaluate the effect of trade openness over time and, particularly, the impact of the 
dramatic changes that followed the commencement of the WTO. Finally, the time dimension 
of the panel data allows us to include periods of important recent fluctuations such as the global 
financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis. 
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the resource curse 
literature. Section 3 describes the conceptual framework of the importance of trade. The 
                                                          
9 A point-source resource is a resource concentrated in a single identifiable location (i.e., not diffused in wide 
areas). 
10 Following Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and Schneider (2012); Arezki and Brückner (2011); Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2010); and Collier and Hoeffler (2005), we use oil rents (% of GDP) as a proxy of natural resource abundance. 
Rents are basically net profits from resource extraction, defined as the value of the product minus total cost of 
production. Rents measure the value of natural resources for a country. More precisely, they provide a less 
ambiguous measure of resource dependence compared with those previously used such as primary commodity 
exports, oil exports and reserves. The rent data tells us the value of the resource in the open market relative to the 
productivity of the economy, and, indirectly, the value of capturing them (De Soysa & Neumayer 2007). For 
robustness, we use the natural resource rent (% of GDP). We define ‘abundance’ as the resource contributing a 
large share of a country’s GDP. 
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methodology of this study is described in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data and description 
of the variables and Section 6 presents the empirical results from panel data estimations. 
Section 7 provides our conclusions and directions for future studies. 
2. Overview of the resource curse literature 
To study the role of natural resources in economic growth, it is essential to investigate the 
mechanisms that link endowments of natural resources to poor economic performance. In the 
literature, various economic and political reasons have been discussed for the failure to 
transform natural resources into economic growth including the ‘Dutch disease’, political rent-
seeking and corruption, poor institutional quality, commodity price volatility and lack of 
diversification. We discuss these factors in detail in the following sections. 
2.1. The Dutch disease 
One of the most common economic reasons suggested for the resource curse is popularly 
known as the Dutch disease. In most resource-rich countries, sectors other than resources are 
likely to suffer from a real appreciation of the national currency due to natural resource earnings, 
in part, being absorbed by the domestic non-tradeable sectors [see, e.g., Corden and Neary 
(1982), Sachs and Warner (1995), Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) and Iimi (2007)].11 This 
results in exports from the non-resources sectors (usually manufacturing) become more 
expensive relative to the world market, thus making those sectors less competitive. 
Consequently, total national income is reduced, ultimately causing economic growth to slow. 
This mechanism is known as the ‘spending effect’ (see Figure 2). 
                                                          
11 Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984) first developed the Dutch disease model. Iimi (2007) described 
Dutch disease as the most prominent channel of the resource curse. Sachs and Warner (1995) argued that the 
Dutch disease is responsible for the slow economic growth of resource-rich African countries. 
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  Figure 2: The spending effect in the ‘Dutch disease’ 
  
 
 
 
 
   Source: Badeeb, Lean and Clark (2017). 
2.2. Political rent-seeking and corruption 
According to Gylfason (2001), Lam and Wantchekon (2003), Hodler (2006) and Deacon and 
Rode (2015), the powerful political elites of resource-rich countries can control revenues from 
natural resources. These elites tend to distribute the windfall revenues for the benefit of their 
own existing business and personal networks, instead of investing them in the development 
sectors. This rent-seeking behaviour increases income inequality which hampers sustainable 
economic growth. Moreover, such revenue windfalls are considered to be one of the major 
reasons for the increasing conflict between stakeholders such as taxpayers, politicians, local 
tribes and developers (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 2013). Such conflict discourages both 
domestic and international investment which also leads to lower economic growth. 
2.3. Poor institutional quality 
Another reason for the resource curse—and closely related to political rent-seeking—is poor 
institutional quality. According to Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) and Mavrotas, Murshed 
and Torres (2011), a country’s institutional quality plays an important role in determining 
whether an abundance of natural resources is a blessing or a curse. It is argued that high levels 
of growth in resource-rich countries are due to the way in which rents from natural resources 
are distributed through existing institutional arrangements. If institutional quality is good, a 
generous endowment of natural resource is a blessing. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006); 
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Torvik (2009); and Sarmidi, Hook Law and Jafari (2014) argue that the adverse effect of natural 
resource abundance on economic growth will be dissipated if institutional quality is improved. 
2.4. Commodity price volatility 
Commodity price volatility is another important channel for the resource curse. According to 
the Bellemare, Barrett and Just (2013); Dwyer, Gardner and Williams (2011); Tujula and 
Wolswijk (2004); and Dehn (2000), commodity price volatility generates uncertainty in the 
economy, delays stability in the budget, undermines the predictability of economic planning 
and potentially contributes to lower economic growth. Moreover, Catão and Kapur (2004) 
argue that during volatile periods countries need more international borrowing to smooth 
consumption. Moreover, countries in this situation can expect to face stringent constraints on 
their borrowing capacity since financial markets will not only be aware of the default risk that 
volatility itself generates but will also be mindful that aggregate consumption and real 
investment decrease in times of commodity price volatility. These dynamics will likely lead to 
lower economic growth.12 
2.5. Lack of diversification 
Another reason for the resource curse is the lack of economic diversification in countries 
abundant in natural resources. The major share of export earrings in these countries is generated 
from just one or a few resources. This leads to economic vulnerability from exogenous shocks 
and results in slow economic growth (De Ferranti et al. 2002). Moreover, the natural resource 
sector is generally capital intensive and location specific (Masten & Crocker 1985). 
Consequently, natural resource development brings few positive externalities to forward and 
                                                          
12 According to Başkaya, Hülagü and Küçük (2013); Salim and Rafiq (2011); and Guo and Kliesen (2005), 
consumer demand decreases due to the adoption of a precautionary savings mindset by consumers who are worried 
and uncertain about future income and unemployment levels as they are fearful that these levels may be adversely 
impacted during a period of commodity price volatility. Consequently, real investment decreases during periods 
of price volatility (Masih, Peters & De Mello 2011; Henriques & Sadorsky 2011; Guo & Kliesen 2005; Bredin & 
Fountas 2005). 
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backward industries (Sachs & Warner 1995). Therefore, the learning-by-doing effect is not 
expected to be powerful in these economies. 
There is considerable literature on the above-mentioned transmission channels that give 
rise to the resource curse, but scant discussion about the dynamics associated with trade 
openness. Therefore, this study, which investigates the role of trade openness using panel data 
models, brings a new dimension to the resource curse literature. 
3. Conceptual framework: Importance of trade in resource-rich countries 
The uneven geographical distribution of resource endowment between countries plays a 
critically important part in explaining the significance of trade openness. Most of the world’s 
natural resources are concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, while many 
countries have limited or no natural resources. For example, about 90 per cent of the world’s 
proven oil reserves are in just 13 countries (BP 2017).13 Consequently, international trade plays 
a significant role in reducing the disparity in natural resource endowment of countries by 
allowing resources to move from areas of excess supply to areas of excess demand. Moreover, 
due to the excessive fixed costs in extracting the resources, large-scale extraction is required to 
achieve economies of scale. Large-scale production is only beneficial if there is a large market 
for exports of that resource. Overall, international trade is associated with a more efficient 
allocation of natural resources that leads to an increase in social welfare (Cho & Diaz 2011). 
Another important feature of natural resources is the dominant position of this sector in 
national economies. Many of resource-rich countries tend to rely on a narrow range of export 
products. Figure 3 shows the value of export product concentration index (PCI) of different 
                                                          
13 The Middle East countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, United Arab Emirate, Qatar, Yemen and 
Oman) contain about 48 per cent of the world’s total oil reserve, and Venezuela contains nearly 18 per cent as of 
2016. The distribution of other fuels is also concentrated in a very small number of countries. For example, 10 
countries possess 80 per cent of global natural gas reserves in 2016, and just nine countries have 90 per cent of 
the world’s coal reserves. 
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countries along with shares of natural resources in total merchandise exports for selected 
economies.14 The PCI is based on the number of products in the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) at the three-digit level that exceeds 0.3 per cent of a given country’s 
exports collected from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
            Figure 3: Dominance of fuel resource exports 
 
              Source: Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD (2016) and WB (2019). 
From Figure 3, we can observe that the share of fuel in Kuwait, Brunei, Iraq and Angola 
is about 100 per cent of total merchandise exports by 2015. With very few exceptions, countries 
with a high concentration index also have a high share of fuel resources in their total 
merchandise exports. The dominance of natural resources in exports follows the hypothesis of 
comparative advantage theory arguing that countries will specialise in the production of goods 
where they have a comparative advantage and export them in exchange for other products. This 
                                                          
14 The PCI shows to what extent exports and imports of individual countries or country groups are concentrated 
on several products rather than being distributed homogeneously among products. It is measured as: 
PCI = 
√
∑
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is a direct implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin model which proposes that countries export what 
they can produce. 
Overall, the above-described two characteristics of natural resources explain the 
importance of international trade to the efficient distribution of natural resources. As the 
government’s revenue in resource-rich countries depends on one or few resources, if there are 
trade barriers then total revenue will decrease, causing slower economic growth. For example, 
Iran’s government revenue and economic growth largely depend on the export of crude oil. 
However, due to some international restrictions, Iran cannot produce and sell oil at the optimum 
level and, thus, is forced to sell in the domestic market at a lower price. Consequently, Iran 
loses revenue, hampering economic growth. In general, economic growth largely depends on 
trade openness, especially for resource-rich economies. 
4. Methodology 
To explore the impact of oil rent (% of GDP) on economic growth, we use the cross-section 
and period fixed effect model (combined model). However, other five-panel data estimation 
models—pooled least square (PLS) model, cross-section fixed effect model, cross-section 
random effect model, period fixed effect model, period random effect model—are also 
considered for robustness.15 The combined model allows us to eliminate bias arising from both 
unobservable variables that differ over time and across countries. For example, real GDP, trade 
and oil rent will differ between countries due to their differing geographies, natural 
endowments, political and cultural systems and other basic factors. These variables, however, 
do not differ over time. On the other hand, technological development or international 
agreements can change productivity growth globally which increases output over time. Period 
fixed effect model removes the effect of those country-invariant characteristics. Consequently, 
                                                          
15 These models are described in Appendix 2. 
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the combined fixed effect model removes the effect of those time-invariant and cross-section 
invariant characteristics from the model so that we can assess the net impact of oil rent (% of 
GDP) on economic growth. We adopt the following combined model to examine the impact of 
oil rent on economic growth: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑡 +  𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                   (1) 
Where ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the change in log of real GDP per capita; ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the 
lag in the change in log of real GDP per capita; 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 indicates the log in oil rent (% of GDP); 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 indicate log in unemployment rate (% of total force), log 
in foreign direct investment (% of GDP), log in current account balance (% of GDP) and log 
in military expense (% of GDP) respectively; 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the infant mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live births); and 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 represents the log of trade openness (% of GDP). A detailed 
description of the variables included in equation (1) is presented in Table A1 in Appendix 1. 
The subscripts i and t denote country and period respectively. 𝛽0𝑖  and 𝛽0𝑡  are the 
unobserved time-invariant and country-invariant individual effect respectively and the 
idiosyncratic disturbance term is denoted by Ɛ𝑖,𝑡. By using lag dependent variable, we capture 
autocorrelation in the model. In this study, we also include an interaction term in equation (1), 
denoted by 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 , to examine the hypothesis that trade openness significantly reduces 
the resource curse. In equation (1), we use estimates for the full sample period (1980–2017) 
and two subsample periods (1980–1994 and 1995–2017) to allow us to examine the hypothesis 
that the WTO impacts the resource curse. We also estimate equation (1) for the alternative 
measures of trade openness [exports (% of GDP), imports (% of GDP)] and natural resource 
rents (% of GDP). 
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5. Data and description of the variables 
In this section, we discuss the definition of the variables and sources of the data. We also 
discuss the characteristics of the data such as unit root, descriptive statistics and correlation 
matrix of the variables. 
5.1. The data 
To estimate the models, this study employs an unbalanced annual panel data dataset for 95 
countries covering the period 1980–2017, where the countries and period included are 
determined by data availability.16 The data for real GDP per capita, oil rent, foreign direct 
investment, current account balance, military expense, infant mortality rate and trade openness 
are collected from the World Development Indicator (WDI) of the WB. Unemployment rate 
data are collected from the World Economic Outlook of the IMF.  
5.2. Unit root test, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
We estimate the unit root to test the stationary for all variables by using the Augmented Ducky–
Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips–Perron (PP) test. The stationary variable is characterised by 
having a constant mean and variance over time, and the covariance between two values in the 
series depends on the length of the time between the two values, but not on the actual times 
when the value is observed. With the exception of real GDP, all variables included in the model 
are stationary at p = 0.05. The p-value of log real GDP is >0.05, indicating that this variable is 
not stationary. To make the series stationary, we take the first difference of this series. The 
results of the unit root, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Tables A3, 
A4 and A5 respectively in Appendix 1. 
                                                          
16 List of 95 countries are documented in Table A2 in Appendix 1. 
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6. Results and discussion 
In this section, we describe all empirical results estimated by six estimation methods—PLS 
model, cross-section fixed effect model, cross-section random effect model, period fixed effect 
model, period random effect model, and combined fixed effect model. In Section 6.1, we 
describe the estimated coefficients for the full sample period (1980–2017) and two subsample 
periods (1980–1994 and 1995–2017) estimated with the combined fixed effect model. 
6.1. Main results 
Table 1 reports the results. In this section, we only discuss the coefficient of the variables of 
interest—log in oil rent, log in trade openness and the interaction term between log in oil rent 
and log in trade openness. The coefficient of log in oil rent is negative, indicating that log in 
change of real GDP per capita decreases with the increase of log in oil rent and the estimated 
elasticity is –0.04 (see column 1 in Table 1). All other things being equal, a one per cent 
increase in log in oil rent is associated with a decrease in change in real GDP per capita of over 
0.04 per cent. This negative association between growth in real GDP per capita and oil rent is 
evidence of the resource curse. 
The positive coefficient of log in trade openness indicates that trade openness positively 
affects growth in real GDP per capita. The coefficient of the interaction term between log in 
trade openness and log in oil rent is also positive, indicating that opening to trade reduces the 
negative impact of log in oil rent on log in change of real GDP per capita. These results are 
significant (p = 0.01) and consistent with different time and country fixed effect and random 
effect models. The growth impact of a marginal increase in oil rent implied from equation (1) 
is: 
                                       
𝑑(∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)
𝑑(𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡)
=  − 0.04 +  0.01 (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)  
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We see that the resource curse is weaker where there is a higher level of trade openness. 
The coefficient of oil rent is –0.04, but when we add the value of interaction term the value of 
the coefficient becomes smaller (–0.04 + 0.01 = –0.03 < –0.04). Statistically, we can observe 
that resource curse decreases by 25% with the opening to trade. In the case of cross-section 
fixed effect model (column 3 in Table 1), the size of the coefficients of oil rent, trade openness 
and interaction term are similar to the combined model. However, the size of the coefficients 
is much smaller in the PLS and random effect models (columns 2, and 4 in Table 1). One 
plausible reason is that in the PLS and random effect models, the unobservable variables are 
assumed uncorrelated with all observed variables. As a result, the size of the coefficient is 
smaller than the combined fixed effect model (–0.02). There are some major differences in the 
coefficients for the combined fixed effect and random effect models, which might reflect the 
importance of omitted variable bias in the latter. In the period fixed effect and period random 
effect models, the size of the coefficient is smaller than the cross-section fixed effect and the 
combined fixed effect models, indicating that country-invariant unobservable variables such as 
different agreements and laws are not correlated with the observed variables (see columns 5 
and 6 in Table 1). 
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Table 1: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) in sample period (1980–
2017). 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 Cross-section 
and period fixed 
(1) 
PLS 
 
(2) 
Cross-section 
fixed 
(3) 
Cross-section 
random 
(4) 
Period 
fixed 
(5) 
Period 
random 
(6) 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.40*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
0.36*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  –0.04*** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
–0.02*** 
(0.007) 
[0.01] 
–0.04*** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
–0.02*** 
(0.006) 
[0.01] 
–0.01*** 
(0.006) 
[0.009] 
–0.01*** 
(0.006) 
[0.009] 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  –0.0007 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.0001 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
0.0003 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  –0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.005 
(0.006) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 –0.08** 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
–0.04* 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.05* 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
–0.04* 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.06** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.05** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 –0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.002] 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.0009] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.009] 
𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡  0.009** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡*𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
R2 0.48 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. ***, ** and * indicate 
the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
To investigate the impact of the WTO, we split our full sample period (1980–2017) into 
two subsample periods (1980–1994 and 1995–2017). We hypothesise that the introduction of 
the WTO on 1 January 1995 may have significantly increased international trade and, thereby, 
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reduced the resource curse.17 According to Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz (2007) and Tomz, 
Goldstein and Rivers (2007), participation in the WTO substantially increased trade for the 
whole world. Moreover, Nicita, Olarreaga and Silva (2013) demonstrate that the average 
country would face a 32 per cent increase in tariffs on their exports in the absence of the WTO. 
In Table 2, we present the empirical findings on the nexus between real GDP per capita 
and oil rent for the two subsample periods (1980–1994 in column 1 and 1995–2017 in column 
2) and compare these with the full sample period. The coefficient of log in oil rent in the period 
1980–1994 is negative, and the estimated elasticity is –0.05 (column 1 in Table 2). All other 
things being equal, a one per cent increase in log in oil rent is associated with a significant 
decrease in the log in change of real GDP per capita of over 0.05 per cent on average. The size 
of the coefficient is about 40% and 20% higher than subsample period 1995–2017 (column 2 
in Table 2) and the full sample period 1980–2017 (column 3 in Table 2) respectively. 
From column 2 in Table 2, we observe that the coefficient of interaction term (between 
log in oil rent and log in trade openness) is positive and statistically significant during the 
period 1995–2017. This result indicates that trade openness has a significant impact on 
reducing the resource curse during that period. However, we do not find any statistically 
significant impact of trade openness during the period 1980–1994 (refer to column 1), although 
the coefficient is positive and similar with the other periods. Therefore, we can say that the 
result in the period 1995-2017 led to the results for the full sample period (column 3). 
                                                          
17 We split sample periods based on the introduction of the WTO, not the GATT, because most economies started 
following the WTO’s rules and regulations in 1995 (124 countries in 1995 and 164 in 2017), prior to the GATT 
in 1947. 
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Table 2: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) in different sample periods. 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 1980–1994 
(1) 
1995–2017 
(2) 
1980–2017 
(3) 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.32*** 
(0.04) 
[0.05] 
0.36*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
0.40*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  –0.05* 
(0.03) 
[0.03] 
–0.03* 
(0.01) 
[0.02] 
–0.04*** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡 –0.004 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
–0.0007 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  0.25 
(0.24) 
[0.23] 
–0.001 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 –0.28** 
(0.11) 
[0.22] 
–0.07** 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
–0.08** 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 –0.04*** 
(0.01) 
[0.02] 
–0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
–0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 –0.0009 
(0.02) 
[0.02] 
0.01*** 
(0.005) 
[0.005] 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 0.02* 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.006] 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡*𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  0.01 
(0.008) 
[0.008] 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
R2 0.49 0.50 0.48 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.47 0.44 
Periods 38 23 38 
Countries 57 95 95 
Observations 564 1,935 2,499 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. ***, ** and * indicate 
the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
From the above discussion, it is concluded that there is a negative relationship between 
log in oil rent (% of GDP) and log in change of real GDP per capita; that is, the resource curse. 
Although in classical theories it is assumed that an abundance of natural resources is a blessing 
for economic growth, we concur with Sachs and Warner (1995) who empirically show that 
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resources are a curse for the economy. However, we provide evidence that trade openness can 
reduce the resource curse. 
6.2. Robustness results 
To check the robustness of the results, we use two alternative measures of trade openness—
exports (% of GDP) and imports (% of GDP).18 Our empirical findings show that the resource 
curse reduces with the increase of both exports and imports. With the increase of exports, 
economies can gain access to international prices and earn more revenue from royalties, 
thereby increasing real GDP per capita. On the other hand, countries can import advance 
technologies to more efficiently extract oil resources and/or produce final products to earn more 
revenue that increases real GDP per capita. For further robustness, we use natural resource rent 
(% of GDP) instead of oil rent (% of GDP) as a measure of resource abundance and find similar 
results.19 All robustness findings are presented in Tables A6–A10 in Appendix 3. 
6.3. Discussion of the results 
Overall, the panel data regression models suggest that having an abundance of oil resources 
plays a significant role in slowing economic growth—that is, it serves as a resource curse. 
Many reasons have been put forward in the literature for this surprising result, including rent-
seeking behaviour, poor institutional quality, commodity price volatility and lack of 
diversification. In this study, we investigated the impact of trade openness in reducing the 
resource curse. Our empirical findings show that trade openness significantly decreases the 
resource curse in our full sample period (1980–2017). More open trade policies provide access 
to advanced technologies that increase efficiency by reallocating the factors of production. 
                                                          
18 Exports (% of GDP) and Imports (% of GDP) represent the value of all goods and services provided and received 
to and from the rest of the world respectively.  
19 Natural resource rent (% of GDP) is the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents and forest 
rents. Data for Exports (% of GDP), Imports (% of GDP) and natural resource rent (% of GDP) are collected 
from the World Development Indicators of the WB. 
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These trade policies also facilitate access to large markets where increasing competition drives 
innovations and strengthens managerial skills which in turn generates substantial economic 
growth. Accordingly, Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2011) report that the resource curse has turned 
into a blessing in countries with a high degree of trade openness such as Australia, Bolivia, 
Barbados, Canada, Chile, Malaysia and the United States. 
To understand the role of the WTO in increasing merchandise trade, we split our sample 
period into two subsample periods, 1980–1994 (pre-WTO) and 1995–2017 (post-WTO). Our 
empirical findings suggest that trade openness had a significant impact on reducing the resource 
curse in the sample period 1995–2017. However, there was no significant effect in the sample 
period 1980–1994, possibly due to the fact that total merchandise trade increased after the 
commencement of the WTO in 1995 which helped to weaken the strength of the dynamics 
driving the resource curse. 
Overall, based on our empirical findings, we can argue that outward-looking trade 
policy is helpful for economic growth and reduces the risk of experiencing the resource curse. 
Therefore, policymakers should concentrate on how they can make the economy more open by 
reducing existing tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Increased international trade (both export and 
import) helps economies to be more efficient by enabling the adoption of new technologies and 
sharing of advanced knowledge which generates long-run economic growth. 
6.4. Marginal effect 
Marginal effect tells us how the dependent variable changes when a specific explanatory 
variable change in the regression analysis. In case of continuous variables, marginal effect 
measures the instantaneous rate of change. Marginal effect estimation provides a good estimate 
to the amount of change in the dependent variable that will be produced by a change in 
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independent variables. In this study, we compute the marginal effect of oil rent on the change 
in GDP per capita. Based on the estimates in Table 1, this produced: 
                                      
𝑑(∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)
𝑑(𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡)
=  − 0.04 +  0.01 (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)                                 (2) 
From the above equation, we can see that the marginal effect of oil rent on the change 
in real GDP per capita is an increasing function of trade openness. Figure 4a plots the marginal 
effect, 
𝑑(∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃)
𝑑(𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿) 
, on the Y-axis and trade openness on the X-axis. From this plot, we can observe 
that the marginal effect of the oil rent on economic growth is an increasing function of trade 
openness in the full sample period. We also observe from Figure 4a that this effect becomes 
positive and significant with higher trade openness. In Figures 4b and 4c, we present the 
marginal effect of trade openness on GDP for the sample period 1980–1994 and 1995–2017 
respectively, and we observe that in the sample period 1980–1994 there is no significant impact 
of trade openness on GDP. So, the results in the sample period 1995–2017 led to the results for 
the full sample period.20 
    Figure 4a: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (full sample period 1980–2017) 
 
                                                          
20 The figures of all robust analysis are presented in Appendix 4 (Figures A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5). 
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          Figure 4b: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (sample period 1980–1994) 
 
           Figure 4c: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (sample period 1995–2017) 
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7. Conclusion  
This study aims to revisit the resource curse paradox and examines the role of trade openness 
in reducing the resource curse. Using different dynamic panel data models for 95 countries for 
the period 1980–2017, this study finds that economic growth decreases with the increase of oil 
resource abundance. A one per cent increase in oil rent causes a 0.04 per cent decrease in real 
GDP per capita. Although our empirical findings support the resource curse hypothesis, the 
study finds that trade openness is a possible channel to reduce the resource curse. On average, 
trade openness reduces the negative effect of oil rent on real GDP per capita by 25%. Trade 
openness allows countries to obtain competitive prices for their resources in the international 
market and access advanced technologies to more efficiently extract resources. We also find 
that trade openness significantly affects the resource curse after the introduction of the WTO. 
An important policy implication is that natural resource–rich economies that want to reduce 
the resource curse should consider further opening their economies. 
This study can be extended by focusing on another transmission channel of the resource 
curse, income inequality. According to Fum and Hodler (2010) and Parcero and Papyrakis 
(2016), income inequality is high in resource-rich countries, especially those with point-source 
resources. One reason is that inefficient allocation of resources among sectors increases income 
inequality. Trade openness plays an important role in reallocating resources in the sectors 
where a country has a comparative advantage. This efficient distribution of resources helps to 
reduce income inequality in resource-rich countries and, thus, spurs economic growth. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1: Description of the variables 
Variables Mnemonic Description Source 
Dependent variable      
Real GDP per capita 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by mid-year 
population. Data are in constant 2010 
US dollars. 
WDI, WB 
Control variables      
Oil rents (% of GDP) 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 Oil rents are the difference between the 
value of crude oil production at 
regional prices and total costs of 
production. We add 1 before 
converting into logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Unemployment rate (% 
of total labour force) 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡 Unemployment rate can be defined by 
the OECD harmonised definition. The 
OECD harmonised unemployment rate 
gives the number of unemployed 
persons as a percentage of the labour 
force. 
World 
Economic 
Outlook, IMF 
Foreign direct 
investment, net 
outflows (% of GDP) 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Foreign direct investment refers to 
direct investment equity flows in an 
economy. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, and 
other capital. We add 100 before 
converting into logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Current account balance 
(% of GDP) 
 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 Current account balance is the sum of 
net exports of goods and services, net 
primary income and net secondary 
income. 
WDI, WB 
Military expense (% of 
GDP) 
 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Military expenditures data from SIPRI 
are derived from the NATO definition, 
which includes all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forces. We 
add 10 to convert logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Mortality rate, infant 
(per 1,000 live births) 
 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 Infant mortality rate is the number of 
infants dying before reaching one year 
of age, per 1,000 live births in a given 
year. 
WDI, WB 
Trade openness (% of 
GDP) 
𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 Trade is the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services measured as a 
share of GDP. 
WDI, WB 
Note: WDI = World Development Indicators. We use first difference to get the data in stationary in real GDP per 
capita series and expressed as ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡. 
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Change in GDP per capita (∆𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊,𝒕): Change in log of real GDP per capita is our 
dependent variable and is denoted by ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 in the model. As we want to measure the impact 
of oil rent (% of GDP) on the economic growth, we use change in log of real GDP per capita 
because it represents the level of development of a country. 
Oil rent (𝑳𝑶𝑰𝑳𝒊,𝒕): According to the conventional view, resource abundance stimulates 
economic growth. However, Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that resource abundance impede 
economic growth which is known as resource curse. By following Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and 
Schneider (2012), Arezki and Brückner (2011), Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) and Collier 
and Hoeffler (2005), we use oil rents (% of GDP) as a measure of natural resource abundance. 
Rents are basically net profits from resource extraction, defined as the value of the product 
minus the total cost of production. Rents measure the value of natural resources for a country 
more precisely, providing a less ambiguous measure of resource abundance compared with 
those used previously such as primary commodity exports, oil exports and reserves. In this 
study, we expect the sign of oil rent (% of GDP) will be negative. 
Unemployment rate (𝑳𝑼𝑵𝒊,𝒕): According to the Okun’s law, a one per cent increase 
in unemployment rate causes two per cent decreases in GDP. A country faces higher costs in 
the form of unemployment benefits which negatively affects economic growth. An increased 
unemployment rate also increases the chance of social unrest. 
Foreign direct investment ( 𝑳𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊,𝒕 ): FDI plays a significant role in improving 
economic growth. It also indicates the strength of a country’s financial market. According to 
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998), FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of 
technologies, knowledge and human capital, all associated with higher productivity. Thus, the 
relationship between FDI and change in real GDP per capita would be positive. 
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Current account balance (𝑳𝑪𝑨𝑩𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that current account balance has a 
positive impact on economic growth. If a country’s balance increases, indicating that its exports 
exceed its imports, that encourages investment and FDI. Sahin and Mucuk (2014) found that 
current account deficit negatively affects economic growth in developing countries. 
Military expense (𝑳𝑴𝒊,𝒕): According to Cappelen, Gleditsch and Bjerkholt (1984), 
military expenditure reduces economic growth. As this expenditure increases, so does 
government total expenditure, leading to higher tax rates in the private sector that ultimately 
reduce private investment and the country’s output. 
Mortality rate ( 𝑳𝑴𝑶𝑹𝒊,𝒕 ): It is expected that decrease mortality rate promotes 
economic growth. According to the Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) decrease in mortality rate reduces 
the precautionary demand for children and increases potential investment in each child that 
increase the human capital and productivity for an economy.  
Trade openness (𝑳𝑻𝒊,𝒕): Trade openness (% of GDP) is calculated as the total of 
exports and imports expressed as a percentage share of GDP. According to endogenous growth 
theories, a country with more trade openness will grow faster than a country with a lower 
degree of openness, because the former has more opportunity to adopt new technologies. Also, 
trade openness increases the flow of international capital in the form of FDI. There is likely to 
be less interest in investing in an economy that imposes tariffs and non-tariff barriers on 
investment and that creates barriers to the repatriation of capital and profits. Consequently, 
trade openness boosts international trade and capital flows which stimulate economic growth. 
It is expected that the sign of trade openness (% of GDP) will be positive. 
Interaction term: In this study, we are interested in the interaction between trade 
openness (% of GDP) and oil rent (% of GDP) to examine the hypothesis that the resource 
curse will decrease as the degree of trade openness increases. This is because trade openness 
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increases opportunities to obtain a higher price for resources in the international market and 
use advanced technologies to improve productivity and economic growth. We expect a positive 
sign for this coefficient. 
Table A2: List of countries (n = 95) 
Albania China Indonesia Mexico Serbia 
Algeria Colombia Iran Moldova Seychelles 
Argentina Costa Rica Irelands Mongolia Singapore 
Armenia Croatia Israel Morocco Slovak Rep. 
Australia Cyprus Italy Netherlands Slovenia 
Austria Czech Rep. Jamaica New Zealand South Africa 
Azerbaijan Denmark Japan Nicaragua Spain 
Bahrain Dominican Rep. Jordan Nigeria Sri Lanka 
Belarus Ecuador Kazakhstan Norway Sweden 
Belgium Egypt, Arab Rep. Korea, Rep. Pakistan Switzerland  
Belize El Salvador Kuwait Panama Thailand 
Bolivia Estonia Kyrgyz Rep. Paraguay Tunisia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Finland Latvia Peru Turkey 
Brazil France Lithuania Philippines Ukraine 
Brunei Darussalam Georgia Luxemburg Poland The UK 
Bulgaria Germany Macedonia Portugal The USA 
Cabo Verde Greece Malaysia Romania Uruguay 
Canada Honduras Malta Russian Federation Venezuela 
Chile Hungary Mauritius Saudi Arabia Vietnam 
 
Table A3: Unit root test 
 Augmented Ducky–Fuller (ADF)  Phillips–Peron (PP) 
 At level 1st difference At level 1st difference 
 statistics p-value statistics p-value statistics p-value statistics p-value 
LGDP 138.67 0.99 1,062.80 0.00 151.79 0.98 1,156.21 0.00 
LOIL 315.05 0.00 - - 301.44 0.00 - - 
LUN 362.38 0.00 - - 364.88 0.00 - - 
LFDI 509.65 0.00 - - 923.37 0.00 - - 
LCAB 429.20 0.00 - - 459.19 0.00 - - 
LMI 235.43 0.00 - - 278.75 0.00 - - 
LMOR 229.90 0.02  -- 390.70 0.00 - - 
LT 276.40 0.00 - - 298.34 0.00 - - 
Note: LGDP = Log of real GDP per capita, LOIL = Log of oil rent, LUN = Log of unemployment rate, 
LFDI = Log of foreign direct investment, LCAB = Log of current account balance, LMI = Log of military expense, 
LMOR = Log of mortality rate, LT = Log of trade openness. 
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics 
 ∆LGDP  LOIL LUN LFDI LCAB LMI LMOR LT 
Mean 0.02 0.56 1.98 4.62 5.51 1.06 2.41 4.29 
Median 0.02 0.04 2.01 4.61 5.51 1.02 2.39 4.28 
Maximum 0.28 4.13 3.61 5.76 5.68 3.05 4.76 6.08 
Minimum –0.18 0.000 –3.68 2.33 5.32 0.00 0.53 2.44 
Std. Dev. 0.03 0.90 0.64 0.11 0.02 0.46 0.87 0.56 
Skewness –0.35 1.83 –0.80 –5.42 0.62 0.54 0.17 0.11 
Kurtosis 7.28 5.66 6.50 162.17 9.06 4.11 2.29 3.54 
Observations 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 
Note: ∆LGDP = Change in log of real GDP per capita, LOIL = Log of oil rent, LUN = Log of unemployment rate, 
LFDI = Log of foreign direct investment, LCAB = Log of current account balance, LMI = Log of military expense, 
LMOR = Log of mortality rate, LT = Log of trade openness. 
Table A5: Correlation matrix 
 ∆LGDP  LOIL  LUN LFDI LCAB LMI LMOR LT 
∆LGDP  1.00        
LOIL –0.02 1.00       
LUN –0.03 –0.14 1.00      
LFDI 0.008 –0.01 –0.04 1.00     
LCAB –0.09 0.36 –0.26 0.07 1.00    
LMI –0.06 0.18 –0.02 –0.02 0.15 1.00   
LMOR 0.04 0.28 0.17 –0.14 –0.20 0.09 1.00  
LT 0.13 –0.16 –0.17 0.09 0.06 –0.19 –0.32 1.00 
Note: ∆LGDP = Change in log of real GDP per capita, LOIL = Log of oil rent, LUN = Log of unemployment rate, 
LFDI = Log of foreign direct investment, LCAB = Log of current account balance, LMI = Log of military expense, 
LMOR = Log of mortality rate, LT = Log of trade openness. 
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Appendix 2 
A2.1. PLS model 
In the PLS model, we have pooled all the observations in ordinary least square regression, 
meaning that implicitly we assume the coefficient is the same for all the individuals. This model 
does not hold any unobservable heterogeneity among the variables. We can write equation (1) 
in following way: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  +   𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                     (3) 
A2.2. Cross-section fixed effect model 
We use the fixed effect model to further investigate the effect of oil rent on economic growth. 
The cross-section fixed effect model essentially captures all effects that are specific to an 
individual country and do not vary over time. For example, GDP per capita, trade and oil rent 
will vary between countries due to their differing geographies, natural endowments, political 
and cultural systems and other basic factors that vary between countries, but not over time. 
Fixed effect model assumes that these factors may have an impact on the predictor or outcome 
variable, and we need to control for this. Cross-section fixed effect model removes the effect 
of those time-invariant characteristics so that we can assess the net impact of oil rent on 
economic growth. We can write equation (1) with fixed effect as follows: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0𝑖  +  𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                  (4) 
Where  𝛽0𝑖 is the unobserved, time-invariant individual effect. 
34 
 
A2.3. Period fixed effect model 
In this study, we also apply period fixed effect model. This model essentially captures all 
effects that are specific to the periods and do not vary over countries. Macroeconomic variables 
such as GDP, trade, reserve and capital can vary over time. For example, technological 
development or international agreements can change productivity growth globally which 
increases output over time. Period fixed effect model removes the effect of those country-
invariant characteristics so that we can assess the net impact of oil rent on economic growth. 
We can write equation (1) with fixed effect as follows: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0𝑡  +   𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                   (5) 
Where  𝛽0𝑡 is the unobserved, country-invariant individual effect. 
A2.4. Cross-section random effect model 
The rationale behind the cross-section random effect model is that, unlike the cross-section 
fixed effect model, the variation across countries is assumed to be random and uncorrelated 
with the predictor or independent variables included in the model. For example, in the random 
effect model it is assumed that an unobserved effect (e.g., geographical factors, natural 
endowments, political and cultural systems) are not correlated with economic growth. The 
cross-section random effect model includes all fixed effect assumptions plus the additional 
requirement that (Ϙ𝑖) is independent of all explanatory variables in all time periods. Thus, the 
variability of the constant for each section comes from: 
                                                           𝛽0𝑖  =  𝛽0 + Ϙ𝑖                                                             (6) 
Where Ϙ𝑖  is a zero-mean standard random variable. Therefore, equation (3) with 
random effect takes the following form: 
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∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ϙ𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                         (7) 
A2.5. Period random effect model 
This model assumes that variation is arising over time to be random and uncorrelated with the 
independent variables included in the model. So, we can rewrite equation (7) as: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  +   𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + Σ𝑖=0
𝑛 𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ϙ𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                        (8) 
Where Ϙ𝑡 is a zero-mean standard random variable that is independent of all 
explanatory variables in all countries. 
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Appendix 3 
A3. Robustness check 
A3.1. Alternative measures of trade openness 
To check the robustness of the results, we use two alternative measures of trade openness: 
exports and imports. Tables A6 and A7 represent the empirical findings of the impact of oil 
rent on economic growth interacting with the two alternative measures of trade openness. From 
both tables, we find that the coefficient of oil rent is negative and significant, indicating that 
economic growth decreases with the increase of oil rent. Conversely, the positive coefficient 
of log in exports indicates that economic growth increases with the increase of exports. The 
coefficient of the interaction term between log in export and log in oil rent is positive and 
significant, indicating that the negative impact of oil rent on economic growth reduces with the 
increase of exports. The government’s total income will increase with the increase in export 
that increases real GDP per capita. 
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Table A6: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent in terms of export (1980-2017) 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 Cross-section 
and period fixed 
(1) 
PLS 
 
(2) 
Cross-section 
fixed 
(3) 
Cross-section 
random 
(4) 
Period 
fixed 
(5) 
Period 
random 
(6) 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.40*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.36*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.50*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  –0.03*** 
(0.009) 
[0.01] 
–0.01** 
(0.005) 
[0.008] 
–0.03*** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
–0.01** 
(0.005) 
[0.008] 
–0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.007] 
–0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.007] 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  –0.0005 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.0004 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.0001 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
–0.0002 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  –0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.008) 
[0.004] 
0.004 
(0.006) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 –0.12*** 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
–0.06*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.11*** 
(0.03) 
[0.05] 
–0.06*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.07*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.07*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 –0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.002] 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.0009] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.0009] 
𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡  0.004 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡*𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.004] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
R2 0.47 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Note: 𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡  indicates log in exports (% of GDP). Standard errors are presented below the corresponding 
coefficients in the bracket. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
We observe a similar pattern in results when we look at Table A7, where we use imports 
as an alternative measure of trade openness. Economic growth increases with the increase of 
imports and the negative impact of oil rent on economic growth decreases with the increase of 
imports. A country can hire new technologies and high-tech products by allowing import 
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openness. Moreover, import helps to increase efficiency in the managerial level by exchanging 
advanced knowledge between economies. 
Table A7: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent in terms of import (1980–2017) 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 Cross-section 
and period fixed 
(1) 
PLS 
 
(2) 
Cross-section 
fixed 
(3) 
Cross-section 
random 
(4) 
Period 
fixed 
(5) 
Period 
random 
(6) 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.41*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.36*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.50*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  –0.02*** 
(0.009) 
[0.01] 
–0.01** 
(0.006) 
[0.007] 
–0.02** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
–0.01** 
(0.006) 
[0.007] 
–0.01*** 
(0.005) 
[0.006] 
–0.01*** 
(0.005) 
[0.006] 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  –0.0006 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.0005 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.0002 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
–0.0003 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  –0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.005 
(0.006) 
[0.003] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 –0.02 
(0.03) 
[0.05] 
–0.01 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
0.01 
(0.03) 
[0.05] 
–0.01 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.03 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.03 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 –0.01*** 
(0.03) 
[0.004] 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.02*** 
(0.003) 
[0.005] 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 
–0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.002] 
–0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.0009] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.0009] 
𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡  0.007** 
(0.003) 
[0.006] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.006] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡*𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  0.008*** 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
R2 0.47 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.26 0.30 0.25 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Note:  𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡 indicates log in imports (% of GDP). Standard errors are presented below the corresponding 
coefficients in the bracket. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
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A3.2. Alternative measures of resource abundance  
We use natural resource rent instead of oil rent to check the resource curse hypothesis and the 
impact of trade openness on economic growth. Table A8 presents the empirical findings of the 
nexus between natural resource rent and economic growth interacting with trade openness with 
different dynamic panel data models. The coefficient of natural resource rent is negative, 
indicating that economic growth decreases with the increase of natural resource rent and the 
estimated elasticity is –0.05. All other things being equal, a one per cent increase in natural 
resource rents is associated with a significant decrease in the economic growth of over 0.05 per 
cent. This negative association between economic growth and natural resource rents provides 
evidence of the resource curse.  
The coefficient of the interaction term between trade openness and natural resource rent 
is also positive, indicating that a more open trade regime lessens the negative impact of natural 
resource rent on economic growth. These results are significant (p = 0.01) and consistent with 
different time and country fixed effect and random effect models. Tables A9 and A10 show the 
impact of natural resource rent on economic growth in terms of exports and imports and find 
that both export and import reduce the resource course. 
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Table A8: Change in real GDP per capita and natural resource rent in terms of trade openness 
(1980-2017)  
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 Cross-section and 
period fixed 
(1) 
PLS 
 
(2) 
Cross-section 
fixed 
(3) 
Cross-section 
random 
(4) 
Period 
fixed 
(5) 
Period 
random 
(6) 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.40*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.36*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.50*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡 –0.05*** 
(0.01) 
[0.02] 
–0.01** 
(0.006) 
[0.008] 
–0.05*** 
(0.01) 
[0.02] 
–0.01*** 
(0.005) 
[0.007] 
–0.01*** 
(0.005) 
[0.007] 
–0.01*** 
(0.005) 
[0.007] 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  –0.0006 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0007 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.0006 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0007 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.0009 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
0.0002 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  –0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.005 
(0.006) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 –0.06** 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
–0.03 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.03 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
–0.03 
(0.02) 
[0.02] 
–0.05** 
(0.02) 
[0.02] 
–0.04** 
(0.02) 
[0.02] 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 –0.01 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
–0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
–0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 
0.002*** 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.002] 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 0.002 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡*𝐿𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.004] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
R2 0.48 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Note: 𝐿𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡  indicates log in natural resource rent (% of GDP). Standard errors are presented below the 
corresponding coefficients in the bracket. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
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Table A9: Change in real GDP per capita and natural resource rent in terms of export (1980-
2017) 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 Cross-section 
and period fixed 
(1) 
PLS 
 
(2) 
Cross-section 
Fixed 
(3) 
Cross-section 
Random 
(4) 
Period 
fixed 
(5) 
Period 
random 
(6) 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.40*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.36*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.50*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡  - 0.04*** 
(0.009) 
[0.01] 
- 0.01** 
(0.004) 
[0.007] 
- 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
- 0.01** 
(0.004) 
[0.007] 
- 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.006] 
- 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.006] 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  - 0.0003 
(0.0009) 
[0.003] 
0.0007 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
- 0.0002 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0007 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
 0.0001 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
 0.0002 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  - 0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.004 
(0.006) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
- 0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
- 0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 - 0.12*** 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
- 0.06 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
- 0.11*** 
(0.03) 
[0.05] 
- 0.06 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
- 0.07*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
- 0.07*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 - 0.01 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
- 0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
- 0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
- 0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.01** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 
0.002*** 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.002] 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡  -0.002 
(0.003) 
[0.005] 
0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.002 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡*𝐿𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡  0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.004] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.002] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
R2 0.48 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2499 2499 2499 2499 2499 2499 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. The asterisks ***, ** and 
* indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in []. 
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Table A10: Change in real GDP per capita and natural resource rent in terms of import 
(1980-2017) 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 Cross-section 
and period fixed 
(1) 
PLS 
 
(2) 
Cross-section 
Fixed 
(3) 
Cross-section 
Random 
(4) 
Period 
fixed 
(5) 
Period 
random 
(6) 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.41*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.36*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.50*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡  - 0.02*** 
(0.009) 
[0.01] 
- 0.01** 
(0.005) 
[0.005] 
- 0.02** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
- 0.01** 
(0.005) 
[0.005] 
- 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
- 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  - 0.0005 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
- 0.0002 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
 0.0003 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
 0.0001 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  - 0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.005 
(0.006) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
- 0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
- 0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 - 0.01*** 
(0.03) 
[0.05] 
- 0.003 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
- 0.03 
(0.03) 
[0.05] 
- 0.003 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
- 0.02 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
- 0.02 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 - 0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
- 0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
- 0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.002] 
- 0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.01** 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
0.002*** 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.005) 
[0.002] 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001* 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001* 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡  0.002 
(0.004) 
[0.007] 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.01 
(0.004) 
[0.007] 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡*𝐿𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
R2 0.47 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2499 2499 2499 2499 2499 2499 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. The asterisks ***, ** and 
* indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in []. 
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Appendix 4 
In figures A1.a., A1.b., and A1.c., we present the marginal effect of oil rent on economic 
growth in terms of exports for full sample period, and subsample periods 1980-1994 and 1995-
2017 respectively.     
Figure A1.a: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (1980-2017) 
 
Figure A1.b: Sample period 1980-1994                Figure A1.c: Sample period 1995-2017                       
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In figures A2.a., A2.b., and A2.c., we present the marginal effect of oil rent on economic 
growth in terms of imports for full sample period, and subsample periods 1980-1994 and 1995-
2017 respectively.  
Figure A2.a: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (1980-2017) 
 
Figure A2.b: Sample period 1980-1994              Figure A2.c: Sample period 1995-2017                       
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In figures A3.a., A3.b., and A3.c., we present the marginal effect of natural resource rent on 
economic growth in terms of trade openness for full sample period, and subsample periods 
1980-1994 and 1995-2017 respectively.  
Figure A3.a: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1980-2017) 
 
Figure A3.b: Sample period 1980-1994               Figure A3.c: Sample period 1995-2017                
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In figures A4.a., A4.b., and A4.c., we present the marginal effect of natural resource rent on 
economic growth in terms of exports for full sample period, and subsample periods 1980-1994 
and 1995-2017 respectively. 
Figure A4.a: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1980-2017) 
 
Figure A4.b: Sample period 1980-1994            Figure A4.c: Sample period 1995-2017                
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In figures A5.a., A5.b., and A5.c., we present the marginal effect of natural resource rent on 
economic growth in terms of imports for full sample period, and subsample periods 1980-1994 
and 1995-2017 respectively.  
Figure A5.a: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1980-2017) 
 
 Figure A5.b: Sample period 1980-1994            Figure A5.c: Sample period 1995-2017                
     
 
 
 
